redesigned such that the link between employment and Medicaid eligibility was largely broken.
This has, to some extent, reduced the issue of the Medicaid notch and its distortion of labor force participation. Thus, there are many low-income workers now eligible for Medicaid and it is this group in the Medicaid population that is the focus in this paper.
In this paper it is the broader social goals of these healthcare programs that concern us. We are interested in determining how the tax-benefit system that underlies the US health care system (Medicare, Medicaid, and the tax treatment of employer provided medical benefits) affects the well-being of different age groups, and the lifetime well-being of different socioeconomic groups, as well as society as a whole. This research is prompted in part by the finding that Medicare redistributes wealth from the poor to the rich (McClellan and Skinner, 1997) , which indicates that social welfare may be harmed by the program. At the same time we observe the out-of-hand rejection by the Clinton Administration of the proposal by the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare to means test some benefits provided by Medicare (Economist, 1999) , a clear attempt to improve the equitable distribution of benefits should such means testing not undermine support for the Medicare program. Further, while taxes to fund Medicare are currently low, and so the effects on those paying them may be small (in terms of losses in consumption, saving, and healthcare during their working lives), projections of program growth imply substantial tax hikes (from the current 5% of payroll to 14% of payroll (Feldstein, 1999) ), so substantial that the effects on the well-being of the taxpayers, the future Medicare beneficiaries, cannot realistically be ignored.
To examine the various social and individual welfare effects of the inter-and intragenerational redistributions that result from the existing healthcare tax-benefit system we develop an overlapping generations model in which agents differ in age, income/wealth and health status. In our model agents' lifetime choices are affected both by the benefits they receive and the taxes they pay to finance the public healthcare programs, whether they receive benefits or not. Thus, our model, because of its general equilibrium nature, allows us to analyze the effects, both direct and indirect, of all programs simultaneously, on social welfare rather than on the welfare of a specific target group.
A survey of the existing literature establishes that there has been very little theoretical study in a general equilibrium framework of the multiple health care programs that simultaneously exist and interact to affect individuals' health and well-being over their entire lives. Such work includes Gecan (1997) and to a lesser extent, Bohn (1998) . Rather, most studies examine particular aspects of the health care programs separately. A brief review of the literature establishes why a macroeconomic analysis of the publicly funded healthcare system may be of some value. Feldstein (1999) examines, in the face of increasing costs for all government subsidized health care programs, whether Medicare should continue to be funded by a pay-as-you-go system. He believes that simply because those over 65 cannot finance their health care via current employment or other retirement income does not necessarily mean it should be financed in its current manner. This is due to a projected increase in the deadweight losses caused by payas-you-go financing as a result of the higher taxes that would be needed to support this increasingly expensive program. He suggests a forced saving program where the government saves on behalf of individuals during their working years and then returns the accumulated saving to individuals at retirement so that they can fund their own health care. While his proposal may improve the efficiency with which the program is financed, it takes the social value of the program as given, a position on which we are not as sanguine. McClellan and Skinner (1997) consider the incidence of Medicare transfers from taxpayers to beneficiaries through the examination of net lifetime tax payments and program expenditures for individuals across various groups. They find that the program has led to net transfers from the poor to the wealthy due to the relatively regressive financing mechanisms as well as higher expenditures and longer survival of the wealthier beneficiaries. Lee, et al. (1999) measure the flow of Medicare benefits among high-income and low-income neighborhoods.
Their results suggest that per capita Medicare spending increased much more for low-income neighborhoods than high or middle-income neighborhoods from 1990 to 1995, particularly the home health care spending component of Medicare. They find that the distribution of program benefits may be sensitive to changes in specific components of the program. In these papers the social welfare analysis is implicit, and the true extent of redistribution is left unexamined as Medicaid transfers along with the effects of other government programs are ignored.
Although Medicare is the biggest of the government funded health care programs, Medicaid has also received a fair amount of attention, but again in isolation. Hubbard, et al. (1995) show in context of a dynamic programming model that the differential wealth between low and high income groups is, in part, a response to means-tested programs such as Medicaid.
Much of the research on Medicaid deals with the policy implications of changes in the various institutional details. See, for example, Yelowitz (1995), Dubay and Kenny (1997) . Although policy conclusions are drawn, they are drawn under the assumption that the partial equilibrium effects dominate the general equilibrium effects. We question this assumption. Gruber and Poterba (1996) examine the effects of employer provided medical benefits.
Contrary to popular belief, their results suggest that the current federal tax code does not provide a large subsidy to employer provided insurance. This is due to a growing number of employees who receive only partial employer benefits and thus must pay for part of them with their own after-tax dollars. They also consider possible tax reforms which cause a substantial number of currently insured workers not to purchase insurance. This may affect the load factor for those that remain in the insured pool, which may have widespread general equilibrium effects in health insurance markets.
With few notable exceptions, including McClellan, et al. (1997) and Hubbard, et al. (1995) , most Medicare/Medicaid studies examine the distributional effects within a generation, but not across generations. While this is reasonable for Medicaid, it is less so for Medicare given that it is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner. Since Medicare is just 35 years old, it is only the newly retired who will both have paid into the system throughout their working lives and will receive benefits from the system. Thus, the lifetime effects of Medicare on these beneficiaries and on social welfare are as yet unknown. They, however, can be examined within the context of the general equilibrium macroeconomic model developed in this paper. Further, since variations of the model economy are constructed so that some workers receive employer provided medical benefits, while others receive Medicaid or no benefits at all and retirees receive Medicare, the social and individual welfare effects of the programs, both direct and indirect, can be studied simultaneously.
We find that the optimal set and generosity of publicly funded health care programs is very sensitive to the social welfare function and to the prices that various agents in society pay for medical care. For example, the optimal Medicare subsidy rate is zero for many parameterizations of the model. Suppose Medicare exists because of adverse selection in the market for health insurance for the elderly. If the costs of adverse selection are relatively low so that the government's policies can effect only small price reductions relative to the private market, then society is better off without Medicare. This is also true if the social welfare weight placed on the welfare of the old is equal to that placed on the welfare of the young. Further, if the social welfare weight placed on the welfare of the poor young is less than the welfare of the rich young, society is better off not giving Medicaid subsides to the poor young. If the government reimbursal rate of medical care is the same as the market price in a universal health system (Medicare and Medicaid uniformly to all), the optimal uniform Medicaid subsidy rate is zero such that society would be better off reverting to a Medicare only scheme. In all these situations the existence of these programs is social welfare reducing rather than social welfare enhancing. When, however, the programs are welfare improving, they are also redistributive from the rich to the poor both intra-and intergenerationally, where the optimal degree of redistribution increases as the income distribution becomes more unequal. This is true when the programs subsidize medical care at a uniform rate independent of the beneficiary's income, as well as when the subsidy rate may be income dependent. In the latter case, the optimal programs are means tested.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is set out in Section 2 and the equilibrium defined in Section 3. In Section 4 the social welfare properties of the programs are derived and discussed. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
The Model
Consider an infinitely lived economy composed of finitely lived individuals, firms and a government. There are two types of agents: high productivity and low productivity. Denote productivity by φ and index type by j=1,2, φ 1 >φ 2 . A new generation is born at the beginning of each period t, (t=1, 2, 3...) and lives for two periods: youth and retirement. Call this generation t. There is no population growth. Without loss of generality assume N j of type j, j=1, 2, are born at each date where ΣΝ j =1.
In this economy there are three types of goods: a generic good, a medical good, and a non-medical good. The generic good is produced by firms. The medical and non-medical goods are produced by consumers using the generic good.
Consumers
Type j agents, j=1,2, in the first period of their lives, the young, are endowed with φ j units of effective labor that they supply inelastically to firms.
1 They divide their labor income among saving for retirement, payment of payroll Medicare/Medicaid taxes, and the production of medical and non-medical goods, intermediate goods in the production of well-being. Medical goods production may be subsidized by the government via Medicaid, or by an employer via employer provided medical benefits. 2 Non-medical goods include all goods that contribute to the production of well-being but are not directly medical. This composite good includes consumption/nutrition, exercise, and health knowledge. Such life-style factors have been shown to be important determinants of well-being by Gilleskie and Harrison (1998) and Kenkel (1991) among others. Furthermore, non-medical efforts when young may reduce the need for subsequent medical expenditures when old as explored by Grembowski et al. (1993) and Stearns et al. (1998) .
1 By assuming inelastic labor supply we are ignoring the effects of the healthcare system on labor supply decisions. We make this assumption for tractability, recognizing that the existence of job-linked medical benefits can affect an individual's labor supply choice. 2 Medical goods are consumed as health maintenance/investment when agents are young.
Let the rate at which generic goods can be converted into non-medical goods be unity. which is productivity dependent.
These employer provided benefits are converted from generic goods into medical goods by the employer at a rate of .
At the beginning of the second period of a type j agent's life she will contract an illness of type i, with probability π i , i=1,2 3 . The illnesses vary in severity, with i=1 representing a minor illness, and i=2 representing a relatively more serious illness. Each illness i is of the same severity for all agents. Agents divide their accumulated saving between the production of medical and non-medical goods. Medicare subsidizes the production of medical goods alone.
Old agents of type j produce medical goods by converting generic goods into medical goods at a rate of j i p . Under Medicare, subsidization of medical care is universal for all old, for any type j and illness i, at a rate of σ. Thus, all old pay only (1-σ)% of their medical costs, no 3 The probability of an illness is exogenous and is not a function of well-being when young. The extent of the effect of well-being when young on the probability of an illness when old is unclear and further, endogenous probabilities are not tractable in this model. However, intergenerational links are included in this model as well-being when young does directly have an impact on well-being when old. matter what illness they face. The government converts the generic good into medical goods for the payment of its Medicare bill at a rate of j i g .
Let the representative type j member of generation t's preferences be represented by
is the well-being of a type j member of generation t while young,
is the well-being of a type j member of generation t with illness i while old, and β is the discount rate.
Assume that a young type j member of generation t produces the composite good, wellbeing in youth, by combining medical inputs, ) (t m j t and non-medical inputs, ), (t e j t using a constant-returns-to-scale production function. Specifically,
if an agent receives employer provided medical benefits. Similarly, an old type j member of generation t with illness i produces the composite good, well-being in old age, by combining medical inputs, ), 1
and well-being in youth, ) (t h j t , using a constant-returns-to-scale production function.
Specifically,
where
An illness i shock reduces the effectiveness of both medical and nonmedical inputs to the production of well-being. The portion of illness shock i that affects medical inputs is im ϑ while the portion that affects non-medical inputs is .
Firms
The firms in this economy are perfectly competitive profit maximizers that produce a single generic good using the constant returns to scale production function
where A>0 is a productivity constant, K(t) is the capital stock at date t
is effective labor at date t. Effective labor is comprised of labor hours, j N and the productivity, j φ of each type of agent. Capital fully depreciates in the production process.
Government
The government in this economy imposes a uniform proportional tax on the wages of all young workers. The revenues from this tax support both the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Medicare sets a subsidy rate on medical expenditures of the old and the level of benefits each old individual receives is ultimately determined by his/her choice of medical care. 5 Medicaid also sets a subsidy rate for medical expenditures of the young and then the level of benefits received will be determined by their choices of medical care. 6 The government funds its current expenditures with current tax receipts as is the case with the existing Medicare and Medicaid programs. Thus, it must adjust the tax rate that all young workers face such that its budget is balanced. (5), (6) and, in Case 1
Steady-State Equilibrium
The first-order conditions of the representative type j agent's problem are in Case 1
same as (7c) and in Case 3
same as (7c).
Simplifying, we have (10) for Cases 1 and 2 and (11) for Case 3. Note, although the agent's problem reduces to the same equation for Cases 1 and 2, they do not yield the same choices since the government budget constraint is case (program) specific.
The representative firm takes wages and rental rates as given and hires effective labor from each type and capital until their marginal products equal their factor prices.
Because of the assumption of constant returns to scale and agents' inelastic supply of effective labor, equations (12) and (13) also define factor market clearing.
The government must maintain a balanced budget at each date t by adjusting taxes to meet the Medicare subsidy bill
and the Medicaid subsidy bill
Tax revenues will be either a fraction of wages (16) or a fraction of after medical benefit wages (17), depending on the government programs in place.
The goods market clears when demand for goods equals supply of goods. Goods market clearing implies that the saving of the young today totally determine the capital stock tomorrow.
and also by arbitrage (19) ).
Thus, steady-state equilibrium is characterized by equations (23) and (24) 
To this point the various medical subsidies (Medicaid and employer provided medical benefits) have been uniformly applied to all young agents. This was for ease of exposition. The economy, instead, may be a mixed regime with each socio-economic group receiving a different package of subsidies. Thus, to the three cases outlined above, three more will be added. First, let high productivity workers (j=1) receive employer provided medical benefits while low productivity workers (j=2) receive no medical care subsidies. Second, let high productivity workers receive employer provided medical benefits while low productivity workers receive the income-tested Medicaid subsidy. Third, let high productivity workers receive no medical benefits and let low productivity workers receive the income-tested Medicaid subsidy. Although other hybrid subsidy schemes are possible, they are not analyzed since they are not observed in practice. 
Social Welfare
The overarching goal of health care policy is to increase social welfare. Thus, while
Medicare was designed to improve the well-being of the old, it was not to be at the price of lower lifetime well-being. Further, while Medicaid was designed to improve the well-being of the poor, the social welfare benefits were intended to exceed the social welfare costs. But measuring social benefits and social costs is often difficult, and so policy evaluation often takes a different tack and asks only whether the target group's welfare has improved at an acceptable budgetary cost. We, however, can examine how social welfare is affected by these programs.
We assume that a set of steady state social welfare functions can be defined by
where j ω is the weight placed on the well-being of a type j agent 8 , and λ is the weight placed on the well-being of all old agents. 9 By varying the social welfare weights we define a large class of social welfare functions.
The setting of program parameters
Medicare
We first determine the optimal Medicare subsidy rate taking the set of programs as given, and holding the Medicaid subsidy rate and the level of employer provided medical benefits constant. We find, for all variations of the model and for all ω j and distributions of income (relative productivities of the rich and the poor), first the optimal Medicare subsidy rate is an 8 Thus, if 1 2 > ω there is a social concern for the poor over their lifetime that exceeds their weight in the population. 9 Thus, if λ>1, there is a social concern for all old that exceeds their weight in the population. increasing function of the social welfare weight on the well-being of the old, λ, for all λ>0.
Second, the social welfare maximizing Medicare subsidy rate is zero when the welfare of the young and old is equally weighted and when the government reimbursal for medical care is the same as or only a slightly lower price than the market. See Tables 1a-f. Finally, the optimal Medicare subsidy rate is inversely related to the elasticities of well-being when old with respect to medical care and well-being when young as seen in Table 2 . 10 The first part of this result is not surprising. For the baseline elasticities on well-being production function and equal government and individual prices for medical care, there is no weight on the old (λ) great enough to generate the Medicare subsidy observed in practice. It is only with a government reimbursal rate for medical care lower than the market price and/or lower elasticities of well-being when young and with respect to medical care when old (γ 1 ,γ 2 ) in combination with greater weight on the old that the Medicare subsidy rate begins to approach the observed subsidy rate. This result suggests that society as a whole puts greater value on the living standards enjoyed by the elderly than on the living standards of the young. This social valuation could be a result of the voting habits and political activity of the elderly. This notion that the old have greater influence than their population size would suggest is further explored in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) where the old have a stronger political pressure function which relates political activity and leisure time. Or, it could be a reflection of a negative external effect on the welfare of the young of low living standards of the elderly. Thus, while the young individually cannot affect this, society as a whole can.
The second part of the result is more surprising. For our parameterization and for equal weighting on the welfare of the young and the old, the government reimbursal of medical care would have to be at 52% of the market price for the optimal Medicare subsidy rate to be positive. This is because the deadweight loss imposed by the tax system, through reductions in the equilibrium capital stock, is large. Thus, if, for example, the Medicare program is a response to the failure of the market for health insurance for the elderly 11 , this suggests that the market failure must be relatively severe (absent a social welfare weight on the welfare of the old in excess of the old's population weight) before government subsidized medical care financed in a pay-as-you-go manner is welfare improving.
The third part of this result is, perhaps, even more surprising. It says that as the marginal individual benefit of medical care falls, the higher the optimal, positive, Medicare subsidy rate.
This is because at low elasticities the optimal amount of medical care produced when old is small, and the cost to the young of subsidizing that medical care for the old for a given subsidy rate is low, but the social benefit is high. Thus, the optimal subsidy rate increases as the elasticities fall.
Medicaid
Taking the set of programs as given, assume that only the low productivity workers receive Medicaid. Then, holding the Medicare subsidy rate and the level of employer provided medical benefits constant, the optimal Medicaid subsidy rate is increasing in the weight placed on the welfare of the poor (Table 3) , ω 2 , increasing in the income distribution (Table 4) , increasing in the price discount offered by the government to Medicaid recipients (Table 5) , and decreasing in the weight placed on the welfare of the old, λ. Otherwise, if all young receive Medicaid, then the optimal Medicaid subsidy rate is zero for all social welfare weighting schemes (Table 6 ) and income distributions (Table 7) and if the price of government provided medical care under Medicaid equals or exceeds the private market price (Table 8) .
When only the low productivity workers, the poor, receive Medicaid, all else equal, the system redistributes resources from the rich to the poor, increasing the welfare of the poor. This redistribution is social welfare enhancing, although it comes at the cost of reducing the lifetime well-being of the relatively well-off. However, the poor must compete with the old in the welfare calculus. Thus, the more weight placed on the welfare of the old, the more difficult it is to achieve a welfare enhancing transfer from the rich young to the poor young. As income dispersion increases the optimal Medicaid subsidy rate increases as well in variations where only low productivity workers receive Medicaid. This result is not surprising given that if there were no income dispersion there would be no need for redistribution. The optimal income taxation literature discusses this at length, for example, Stern (1976) . When all young qualify for Medicaid and the price of government provided medical care is equal to the private sector price, the young pay in full for the Medicaid benefits they receive (although Medicare is still redistributive), and so the optimal subsidy rate is zero, as the uniformly applied program simply mimics the market. Clearly, when the government reimbursal rate is sufficiently lower than the market for the same care, because, for example, of its ability to mandate coverage and so pool risk (not modeled), the optimal Medicaid subsidy will be positive.
Employer Provided Medical Benefits
Consider next the optimal level of employer provided medical benefits taking the set of programs as given. This level, holding Medicare and Medicaid subsidy rates constant, is zero 12 unless the welfare of the poor receives very little weight in the social welfare calculus. Then, the optimal level of benefits is inversely related to ω 2 as seen in Table 9 . However, whenever all agents are treated equally in the welfare calculation, ω 1 =ω 2 for all λ, if the price of medical care
faced by firms and their workers is the same, then there is no social gain from firm provided medical benefits, and because of the tax treatment of medical benefits, there is a social loss since it makes the funding of Medicare and Medicaid more regressive. See Table 10 . This result holds independent of the distribution of income. Thus, for employer provided benefits to be social welfare enhancing, it must be the case that firms' can buy medical care at a lower price than their employees' on own account, as a result of, for example, risk pooling, which we do not model, or the ability to reduce the transactions associated with medical care provision. This price effect is borne out in our simulations.
Joint Setting of Program Parameters
Although setting program parameters individually is probably a relatively realistic representation of policymaking in the real world, the optimal set of policy parameters when they are jointly chosen is also of great interest. Suppose initially that the poor may get both Medicaid and Medicare and that the rich may get both employer provided medical benefits and Medicare.
Then, holding the weight on the welfare of the old constant, the optimal Medicare and Medicaid subsidy rates are nondecreasing in the weight on the welfare of the poor, and in the proportion of national income earned by the high productivity (rich) young as seen in Table 11 . The optimal level of employer provided benefits is zero whenever individuals, firms, and the government face the same price for medical care. The optimal program mix redistributes income from the rich to the poor. This suggests that populations with more unequal distributions of income also have more generous, as measured by the Medicare and Medicaid subsidy rates, government subsidized health care systems. But, this is not necessarily the case, since it depends on the subsidy package on offer. When both types get Medicaid when young and Medicare when old, essentially a National Health System, the distribution of income, as well as the weight placed on the welfare of the poor does not affect the optimal Medicaid subsidy rate, which should be set to zero (as it mimics the market), unless the government has a price advantage over the market.
Means Testing and Progressive Taxation
Thus far in our analysis we have imposed the constraint on program design such that if a program is offered to both types of agents both also receive the same subsidy rate and/or the same proportional benefit. We are now going to relax this and ask if Medicare is available to all old agents (in all variations), should all receive it, and if so, what is the optimal subsidy rate for each type of agent? We find that for all λ, the optimal Medicare subsidy rate for the poor equals or exceeds the optimal Medicare subsidy rate for the rich as seen in Table 12 . That is, Medicare should be means tested. When Medicare benefits are means tested, the tax rate levied on all young is reduced. This tax reduction enables both rich and poor to produce more medical and non-medical goods, and to save more for retirement. Further, for relatively low weights on the welfare of the old and when the government does not enjoy a price advantage over the private market, social welfare is optimized without Medicare for the rich, which is only the case for the poor at λ=1. But, as the weight on the welfare of the old in the social welfare function increases, all individuals under-invest in own well-being relative to the social optimum. Medicare corrects this.
If we allow for variation in the Medicaid subsidy rate across young agents (applies only to variation 3), should all receive it, and if so, what is the optimal subsidy rate for each type of agent? We find that for all ω, the optimal Medicaid subsidy rate for the poor equals or exceeds the optimal Medicaid subsidy rate for the rich. In fact, the Medicaid subsidy rate for the rich equals zero for all ω and the Medicaid subsidy rate for the poor is increasing in ω. The reduced tax burden, due to the rich young not receiving Medicaid benefits, allows both groups more after-tax income with which to produce medical and non-medical care and save for retirement.
For all weights on the welfare of the poor and when the government does not enjoy a price advantage over the private market, the social welfare is maximal when the rich young do not receive Medicaid which is only the case for the poor at ω=.5. See Table 13 .
Suppose, as is often argued, that means testing is not a politically viable option, but making the tax system more progressive is. For any uniform feasible Medicare and Medicaid subsidy rates, a progressive tax structure is social welfare enhancing in all model variations except variation 3 (where all individuals receive both Medicare and Medicaid subsides). The optimality of the progressive tax arises (for 5 of the variations) since, moving away from a uniform tax rate, for a fixed subsidy rate, the marginal welfare gain to the poor is greater than the marginal welfare cost to the rich. However, this is not the case in variation 3 where the benefit structure is identical and the tax burden for both groups is too great to yield any welfare gain for either group. See Table 14 .
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a general equilibrium model in which the social welfare effects of the two major government health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid, and the special tax treatment of employer provided medical benefits can be simultaneously evaluated.
We find for Medicare to be optimal and to be funded in a pay-as-you-go manner, it must be the case that the government's reimbursal rate of medical care is at a significant discount from the market price or that the elderly's welfare receives a high weight relative to that placed on the welfare of the young in the social welfare function. Further, the program should be redistributive from the rich to the poor, and, holding the tax rate constant, should be means tested. This puts the ideal and the actual at odds. McClellan and Skinner (1997) find that Medicare redistributes resources from the poor to the rich. Further, while President Clinton has suggested expanding Medicare benefits to cover prescription drugs, he has rejected means testing benefits.
Medicaid, the smaller of the two programs, does not have a constituency with the wherewith all to fight for maintenance and expansion of its benefits. We find that it is not optimal to expand this program to both the rich and poor young as the additional tax burden of a National Health-like scheme is so great that it is social welfare reducing. However, our results do suggest that this program when designated for only the working poor who do not have employer provided medical benefits, is social welfare enhancing via redistributions from the rich to the poor young. To achieve these results we need not over-weight the welfare of the poor, since the results continue to hold if the welfare of the poor is underweighted in the welfare calculus. Further, a price advantage for the government is not required. These welfare results hold when the elasticity of well-being with respect to medical care are quite low, and when the intergenerational effect of well-being when young on well-being when old is eliminated. That is to say, the results are very robust to variations in the model. Medicaid, our results suggest, should be, at the least, maintained.
The tax treatment of employer provided medical benefits has an interesting history.
Begun during World War II as a way around wage and price controls, it has since taken on a life of its own as an important part of many wage bargains. As health care costs have increased employers have substituted money wages for benefits, providing their employees with an expanded set of health care options, but out of after tax wages. This change in the structure of total compensation improves the equitability of treatment of all taxpayers, since those who do not receive employer provided benefits paid taxes on all their wages rather than only on their wages net of health care. Further, to the extent that employers can negotiate better health care packages than can individuals on own account, employees still receive the price discount, which is welfare improving. Our results are in full agreement: without price discounts, employers
should not provide health benefits.
Overall our analysis suggests that the steady state macroeconomic effects of publicly provided healthcare can be social welfare improving, but the current system deviates from optimality. Moreover, demographic trends place two stresses on the system. As individuals live longer their medical expenditures rise, increasing the cost of the Medicare program. Further, as the aged-dependency ratio rises, there are fewer young workers to pay for the Medicare program.
What these trends mean for optimal program design, at least in a macroeconomic context, is left for future research.
Appendix 1: Choice of Parameter Values
The baseline set of parameters is listed below and was chosen for the following reasons.
The Medicare subsidy rate, σ, is approximately the share of medical health care expenditures by the old (not including nursing home expenditures) that is paid for by Medicare (Hahn and Lefkowitz, 1992) . The Medicaid subsidy rate, η, is the share of medical expenditures by the young who meet the income-test that is paid for by Medicaid 13 . Medicaid subsidization of the working poor is a relatively new phenomenon and has mainly come about as a result of the Welfare-to-Work legislation in 1996. The program is very much state specific and to this point data is not readily available. However, any changes in the Medicaid subsidy rate affect savings and lifetime well-being monotonically for all the simulations conducted in this paper. The employer provided medical benefit, m, is a percentage of the average worker's total compensation package that she receives in medical benefits (EBRI, 1998) 14 . The results of this paper hold independent of the choice of the baseline value of employer provided medical benefits as all changes in savings and well-being are monotonic. Productivity levels were chosen in order to generate sufficiently large differences in income, and thus well-being, of various groups. The prices of medical care for the young, old and firms are all normalized to one. In doing this, the effects of medical subsidies, to both young and old, on capital accumulation and well-being are isolated and are not intertwined with any price effects. The size of the severe shock is such that individuals in this economy can recover from it with their own income. The 13 Medicaid may be modeled as a direct subsidy/reduction in price of medical care due to the means-testing of the program. Individuals may pay for some medical care out-of-pocket before receiving Medicaid as well as incur implicit costs such as waiting for public medical care or transportation. 14 Estimates of the share of total compensation that employer spending on medical benefits range from 6%-16%. In 1996 employer spending on medical benefits was $262.7 billion while total compensation was $4,425.7 billion so that the share going to employer medical benefits is 6%. Other estimates suggest that the share is as high as 15% if employer contributed medical benefits is taken as a percentage of the average wage. This paper uses the share of employer medical benefits that is close to that of the average worker.
amount that individuals can spend on medical or non-medical care is bounded by zero thus, they cannot spend negative amounts on either medical or non-medical care to spend more on the other. Given this constraint along with the choice of other parameters impacting the value it can take on, the size of the severe shock could not be greater than .04. Accordingly, the minor shock is then adjusted relative to the severe shock. An illness (severe or minor) adversely affects both medical and non-medical care by the same amount in the baseline. However, varying sizes of shocks to the medical and non-medical components of well-being for a given illness were explored such that θ ie may be less than or greater than θ im . There were no significant differences in the results when either of these other two parameter variations were considered. Sensitivity analyses on the probability of contracting illness i and the proportion of the population in productivity group j have been done for the full range (0-1) and suggest that the qualitative results in this paper are not affected by changes in these parameters. Thus, the baseline values were chosen simply as initial values. Capital's share of output, ν, and the intertemporal discount rate, β, have been estimated in numerous studies.
While maintaining the assumption of a constant returns to scale well-being production function when young and old, the elasticity of well-being when old with respect to well-being when young, medical and non-medical care were chosen as a starting point and the findings of this paper hold for a wide range of values. Particular attention is paid to the size of the elasticity of well-being with respect to medical care as it is not necessarily the same as the elasticity of health with respect to medical care which is what has been empirically tested. Most often quoted by health economists is that from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment which reports empirical estimates that are not significantly different from zero (Manning et al., 1987) .
However it could be argued that one's well-being can rise as a result of a check up stating that one is in perfect health, that is the consumption of medical care with no measurable health effects. Empirical estimates of the elasticities with respect to well-being when young and nonmedical care are non-existent. With this uncertainty, extensive sensitivity analyses of the elasticities were done including minimizing or eliminating the link between youth and current well-being. Still the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper.
Medicare subsidy rate σ=.65 Medicaid subsidy rate (to those that meet the income-test) η=.5 Employer provided medical benefit m=w/8 Price of medical care for young workers Productivity level for high productivity workers φ 1 =2 Productivity level for low productivity workers φ 2 =1 Probability of contracting illness i π i =.5 Proportion of the population in each productivity group j (sums to one) N j =.5 Size of the relatively minor shock when old (affects both medical and nonmedical components of well-being)
Size of the more severe shock when old (affects both medical and non-medical components of well-being) θ 2e =θ 2m =.04 Elasticity of well-being when young with respect to medical care α 1 =.333
Elasticity of well-being when old with respect to well-being when young and medical care γ 1 =γ 2 =.333
Capital's share of output ν=.3 Intertemporal discount rate β=.5 Total factor productivity A=1 Weight on welfare of old agents λ=1,5,10,100 Weight on welfare of low productivity workers ω 2 =0.5, 1, 3 Table 6 . Effect of variation in welfare weights of the poor on optimal Medicaid subsidy rate in National Healthcare variation. Variation 3 optimal Medicaid subsidy rate (η)
Welfare weight on the poor (ω 2 ) λ=1 λ=5 λ=10 λ=100
. 5 Table 9 . Effect of variation in welfare weights of the poor on optimal employer provided medical benefits. Variation 4* optimal employer provided medical benefits (m)
Variation 6 optimal employer provided medical benefits (m) welfare weight on the poor (ω 2 ) λ=1 λ=5 λ=10 λ=100 λ=1 λ=5 λ=10 λ=100
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